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Visual Propaganda on Facebook:  
A Comparative Analysis of Syrian Conflicts  
Introduction  
 Visual content has long been an essential part of communication whether political, social, 
international, or business-related (Brantner et al., 2011; Domke et al., 2002; Fahmy et al., 2014; 
Goldstein, 2009; Rose, 2012; Schwalbe and Dougherty, 2015). The emergence of digital 
communication technologies has made the role of visuals in communication more prominent, as 
people opt for easy-to-digest content and share attention-grabbing images via social media 
channels (Alper, 2014; Seo, 2014). News organizations, government agencies, and businesses 
have been attempting to optimize visual content for effective communication.   
 Against this backdrop, popular social media platforms such as Facebook and Twitter have 
served as important venues for political actors in conflict to share images as a part of their 
propaganda messaging. For the purpose of this study, propaganda is defined as a form of 
communication that attempts to promote a certain political agenda and influence the target 
audience’s point of view (Cull and Welch, 2003; Jowett and O’Donnell, 2015). Social media 
platforms have enabled parties in conflict to communicate directly with their target audiences 
absent any need to go through traditional intermediaries such as mass media. For example, Seo’s 
(2014) analysis of Twitter images posted by the Israel Defense Forces and Hamas’ Alquassam 
Brigades during the November 2012 Gaza conflict showed that both sides used various themes 
and frames to emphasize casualties of their own side and to portray the other side as the 
aggressor. In 2013, graphic images of Syrian civilians injured or killed during alleged chemical 
weapons attacks were widely circulated via social media sites such as Facebook, Twitter, 
Instagram, and YouTube (BBC, 2014). A more recent example is a series of graphic Internet 
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videos by the self-proclaimed Islamic State (ISIS) in 2014 showing beheading of Westerners 
(Martinez and Abdelaziz, 2014). 
 While the role of visual propaganda in social media has become more significant and 
widespread, there has been insufficient empirical or theoretical research on this topic. This study 
aims to fill this gap in the literature by conducting content analysis of images posted on the 
official Facebook pages of Syrian President Bashar al-Assad and the National Coalition of 
Syrian Revolution and Opposition Forces. The latter, often called the Syrian Coalition, has 
represented Syrian opposition groups in international meetings (Bouchard, 2014). We analyze 
images posted on the two Facebook pages from April 2013 to September 2014 to cover key 
issues surrounding the recent Syrian conflict such as Syrian chemical weapons situations and the 
emergence of ISIS in the Middle East (BBC, 2014). Specifically, themes, frames, and structural 
features of images posted to the two Facebook groups are compared to see if there are significant 
differences or similarities between the two sides in using images for their propaganda purposes 
during the recent Syrian conflicts following the March 2011 popular protests against the Syrian 
President. Moreover, thematic and structural features of the images are correlated with audience 
reactions to the images—number of likes, shares, and comments—to identify characteristics of 
images that generated most reactions.  
 Empirical research such as this is an important step toward developing solid 
methodological frameworks for analyzing social media-based visual propaganda and persuasive 
messages. It also contributes to building a theoretical model explicating functions and effects of 
visual propaganda during conflicts. It is essential to update theoretical frameworks to reflect 
changes brought about by social collaborative networks facilitated by digital communication 
technologies. The results of this research also have important implications for scholarly and 
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policy communities in the fields of visual communication, international communication, and 
conflict studies.   
Literature review 
Visual propaganda and framing  
Visual imagery has long been a key component of propaganda (Jowett and O’Donnell, 
2015; Green, 2014; Rose, 2012). From ancient coins emblazoned with images of emperors in 
Rome, political posters during World Wars I and II, to graphic Internet videos of the Islamic 
State beheading Westerners in 2014, visuals are used to create “awe and respect” and “a sense of 
potency” (Jowett and O’Donnell, 2015: 327). That is, visual imagery helps maximize desired 
effects by helping elicit emotions necessary for persuasion. For this reason, visuals have been an 
important aspect of propaganda research (Fahmy et al., 2014; Jowett and O’Donnell, 2015; Rose, 
2012).  
In studying visual propaganda, it is important to take into account framing devices used 
to enhance persuasiveness of the message. Framing refers to the ability of communicators to 
influence an audience’s understanding of an issue based on the way they present the issue 
(Entman, 1993; Gamson, 1992; Melki, 2014; Reese, 2007; Scheufele and Tewksbury, 2007). For 
example, Scheufele and Tewksbury (2007) argue that framing is modes of presentations 
communicators adopt in “presenting relatively complex issues in a way that makes them 
accessible to lay audiences” (2007, p. 12).  
Structures of narratives or story lines are important aspects of framing, as they help 
construct and define issues using salient aspects of a social reality that is already understood by 
an audience. In this sense, Gamson and Modigliani (1987: 143) defined a frame as “a central 
organizing idea or story line that provides meaning to an unfolding strip of events, weaving a 
connection among them.” According to Reese (2007: 150), frames are “organizing principles that 
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are socially shared and persistent over time, that work symbolically to meaningfully structure the 
social world.” In cognitive psychology, it has been shown that people use frames to build 
structure and understand their realities as more of a personal narrative (Kinder, 2007). 
In developing organizing narratives for framing, communicators often make a certain 
aspect of an issue more salient and influence how the receiver of the information understands or 
interprets the issue presented. Entman (1993: 52) argues that framing consists of selecting some 
facets of “a perceived reality and making them more salient in a communicating text, in such a 
way as to promote a particular problem definition, causal interpretation, moral evaluation, and/or 
treatment recommendation.” Framing also works by influencing people as to which associations 
should receive greater weight in relation to others (Nelson, Clawson and Oxley, 1997). 
Therefore, frames can play a vital role in stimulating opposition to or support for an event or 
issue by representing specific ideology. In short, frames may guide how people understand the 
world and thus form judgments. 
Visuals play a significant role in presenting an issue in a way that makes selected aspects 
of the issue salient (Borah, 2009; Brantner et al., 2011; Domke et al., 2002; Green, 2014; 
Greenwood and Jenkins, 2015; Schwalbe et al., 2008; Schwalbe and Dougherty, 2015). For 
example, media outlets used different framing devices in covering the U.S.-led invitation of Iraq 
in 2003 emphasizing particular aspects of the Iraq war (Aday et al., 2005; Schwalb et al., 2008). 
A content analysis of images featured in the U.S. mainstream media showed that the visual 
framing changed from conflict to human interest during the campaign’s first five weeks 
(Schwalbe et al., 2008). Another study of framing in television coverage of the 2003 Iraq war 
found that the image of Hussein’s statue in Firdos Square falling served as an effective 
mechanism for presenting a victory frame and “provided a less climactic sense of the war” (Aday 
et al., 2005: 327). Schwalbe and Dougherty’s (2015) analysis of visual frames used by Time, 
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Newsweek, and U.S. News & World Report in covering the 2006 Lebanon War showed that the 
news magazines focused on the war’s negative impact on Lebanon and its people by using 
military conflict and human interest frames. A study of visual framing of the 2011-2012 Syrian 
conflict showed that conflict framing was dominant in images featured in news and public affairs 
magazines though peace framing was also salient in public affairs magazines (Greenwood and 
Jenkins, 2015). Based on an analysis of visual propaganda related to the German invasion of 
Belgium during the First World War, Green (2014) argued that visual representations and 
rhetorical frameworks were used to manipulate public opinion in Britain.  
Propaganda in the social media age 
Recent developments in information and communication technologies (ICTs) have 
significantly influenced techniques of propaganda (Cull et al., 2003; Jowett and O’Donnell, 
2015). The emergence of social media is particularly relevant in this context, as popular social 
media platforms such as Facebook and Twitter have allowed individuals and organizations to 
directly interact with target audiences without having to rely on traditional intermediaries such as 
mass media. Social media refers to a group of applications that allow people to interact with one 
another and create, share, and engage user-generated content using digital network technologies 
(boyd and Ellison, 2007; Ellison and boyd, 2013; Kaplan and Haenlein, 2010). Different types of 
social media serve different purposes. For example, platforms like Facebook, Twitter, and 
Instagram are geared more toward helping build and maintain social relationships. Other 
platforms like YouTube, Flickr, and Pinterest emphasize more on content sharing aspects such as 
video sharing or photo sharing.   
With more than one billion active users on Facebook and 320 million on Twitter 
worldwide (Facebook, 2015; Twitter, 2015), social media is an important venue for domestic and 
international political activities. A report shows that as of 2013 about 83% of the 193 member 
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countries of the United Nations had a presence on Twitter, and 68% of all heads of state and 
government had personal accounts on the micro-blogging site (Burson-Masteller, 2014). As 
Jowett and O’Donnell (2015: 303) put it, “Increasingly, world leaders are becoming astutely 
aware that their every action is being critically examined within this new electronic arena, and 
like the actors that most politicians are, they are adjusting their postures and policies to make the 
most of their exposure.” The emergence of social media poses challenges for political leaders, as 
people have a far greater number of channels through which they can receive and share 
information. Social media-based information warfare has been prominent in conflict situations. 
For example, the Israel Defense Forces and Hamas’ Alqassam Brigades actively used Twitter 
during the 2012 Gaza conflict to build international support for their own side (Cohen, 2012; 
Seo, 2014). 
These are in line with characteristics of the networked information society—
disintermediation, nonmarket peer production, and decentralization of information—facilitated 
by ICTs (Benkler, 2006; Castells, 2010; Shirky, 2011). Increased disintermediation and 
decentralization in information production and diffusion means that propaganda agents no longer 
need to go through mass media to spread their messages to target audiences; they can go directly 
to an audience by utilizing their own social media sites. That is, propaganda agents can more 
easily mobilize the public to amplify their messages if they can identify appropriate channels and 
content. Moreover, they can identify and work with social influencers to serve as “channels of 
communication to broader audiences” through social media platforms (Jowett and O’Donnell, 
2015: 395). The current study continues in this tradition and examines social media-based 
propaganda images used during the latest conflicts in Syria that began with popular uprisings 
against Syrian President Bashar al-Assad in 2011.  
Syrian conflicts and social media 
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Social media platforms played a significant role in facilitating the so-called Arab 
Spring—popular political movements in some Middle Eastern and North African (MENA) 
countries such as Tunisia, Egypt, and Syria since 2010 (Halverson et al., 2013; Howard and 
Hussain, 2011; Kirkpatrick and Sanger, 2011; Shehabat, 2012). Social collaborative networks, 
facilitated by these popular social media sites, helped activists mobilize citizens, organize 
protests, and network with activists in neighboring countries (Howard and Hussain, 2011; 
Kirkpatrick and Sanger, 2011). Social media also provided channels for both activists and 
citizens to express dissatisfaction with the status quo and abuse of power by political leaders in 
their country and thus to create a collective identity against oppression and around resistance 
(Howard and Hussain, 2011; Polletta and Jasper, 2001). It was not only activists but also 
dictators who understood the critical role of social media in information warfare in this age of 
online social networking. This has created a dynamic wherein political messages are exchanged 
via popular social media sites between activists and those who currently hold political power.  
The ongoing civil war in the Syrian Arab Republic, or Syria, is one of the most 
significant recent examples of this. Syria is a MENA (Middle East and North Africa) country 
that shares borders with Iraq, Turkey, Lebanon, Israel, and Jordan. Syrian President Bashar 
Hafez al-Assad assumed the presidency in 2000 when his father, Hafez al-Assad, died after 
ruling the country for 30 years (Erlich, 2014). The popular uprising in Syria began in March 
2011, with pro-democracy demonstrators gathering in the southern city of Derra in protest 
against the government’s arrest and torture of several teenagers who wrote anti-government 
graffiti on a school wall (BBC, 2015). These protests were in line with other freedom movements 
in the MENA region around that time (Harding and Arthur, 2013; Shebahat, 2012). Syrian 
government forces responded by firing on the demonstrators. This was followed by more citizens 
joining the pro-democracy protests. Demonstrations spread across Syria with hundreds of 
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thousands taking to the streets by July 2011 (BBC, 2014, 2015). Protesters demanded an end to 
the authoritarian practices of the Assad regime and the resignation of President Bashar al-Assad 
(Harding and Arthur, 2013; Shebahat, 2012). Opposition groups were armed and fought against 
the Syrian government’s crack down on protesters. A report commissioned by the Office of the 
UN High Commissioner for Human Rights estimated that the number of conflict-related killings 
in Syria reached more than 191,000 as of April 2014 (Price, Gohdes and Ball, 2014). In 
particular, the Assad regime tried to further restrict and control information by attacking media 
organizations and journalists. For example, Syrian government forces raided the nonprofit Syrian 
Center for Media and Freedom of Expression and arrested its officials (Freedom House, 2014). 
The Committee to Protect Journalists (2015) reported that at least 81 journalists have been killed 
in Syria since the 2011 uprising, “making it the second deadliest conflict for journalists” since 
the committee began comprehensive records in 1992. With the geopolitical significance of Syria 
and deepening humanitarian crisis, the Syrian conflict generated international discussions in 
social media arena (Callaghan et al., 2014).    
Since popular uprisings against Syrian President Bashar al-Assad’s regime in 2011, both 
the Syrian opposition and the Assad regime have actively used multiple social media channels 
including Facebook, Twitter, Instagram, and YouTube to counter the other’s claims and to 
promote their own agenda within and outside the country (Curry, 2013; Sadiki, 2012; Shehabat, 
2012). The increased importance of social media in Syria is in line with the significant growth in 
the number of Internet users in the MENA region (Internet World Stats, 2015; Seo and Thorson, 
2012). As of December 2014, about six million people in Syria used the Internet with the 
penetration rate of 26%, compared with 30,000 Internet users in 2000 (Internet World Stats, 
2015).  
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For opposition forces in Syria, social media has been an essential tool to expose 
“brutalities” of the Assad regime to the international community and to diffuse their 
revolutionary or resistance messages to people in and outside of Syria. In particular, Facebook, 
the world’s most popular social media site (Facebook, 2015), played an important role in 
networking and information dissemination. As of March 2015, there were a dozen of active 
Facebook accounts that claim to be accounts of the official Syrian oppositions. These sites 
include Facebook pages named “National Coalition of Syrian Revolution and Opposition 
Forces,” “Syrian National Council,” and “Local Coordination Committees of Syria” (Facebook, 
2015). The number of Facebook “likes” that these sites received as of March 2015 ranged from 
about 900 to more than 110,000. Posts on these sites include content mostly in Arabic or English 
though some are in other languages such as French and Turkish. When the Assad regime 
intensified its ban on foreign press coverage of the Syrian situation and its censorship of social 
media within Syria, Syrian diaspora activists have supported the Syria-based opposition’s social 
media efforts by telling stories of civilian sufferings in Syria via social media (Anden-
Papadopoulos and Pantti, 2013).  
Recognizing the importance of social media in controlling its citizens and its image 
outside the country, Syrian President Bashar al-Assad’s government has also capitalized on these 
new communication channels. The Assad regime used the Syrian Electronic Army, dubbed as 
“Assad’s cyber warriors,” for its social media-based propaganda warfare (Harding and Arthur, 
2013; Shehabat, 2012). They closely monitored and tracked down dissenters and shut down 
websites critical of the Assad regime. In addition to these Internet censorship activities, the 
Assad regime has involved in more subtle propaganda efforts by creating accounts on popular 
social media sites such as Facebook, Twitter, and Instagram. As of March 2015, the Syrian 
President’s Office garnered over 210,000 Facebook “likes,” 13,900 Twitter followers, and 
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44,000 Instagram followers. Despite an increased number of Syrian civilians killed, injured, or 
displaced during the conflicts (UNHCR, 2014), the Syrian government has shared, via these 
social media sites, photos emphasizing normalcy in the country—for example, the Syrian 
President engaging in regular domestic and diplomatic activities and Syrian First Lady Asma al-
Assad interacting with or caring for civilians and military personnel.  
Research questions 
 As discussed above, information and communication technologies (ICTs) played an 
important role in the Syrian revolution, with both Syrian President Bashar al-Assad’s regime and 
opposition forces actively using social media sites to promote their agendas (Sadiki, 2012; 
Shehabat, 2012). The recent conflict in Syria has been described as “the most socially mediated 
in history” (Callaghan et al., 2014: 1). In particular, Facebook was widely used in propaganda 
efforts both by the Syrian President and by Syrian opposition forces in terms of number of posts 
and amount of audience engagement. Both sides actively shared on Facebook imagery, a form 
with cultural and historical significance in the region, to promote their agendas. In this sense, 
content available on the Syrian President Facebook page and the leading Syrian Coalition 
Facebook page provides an important opportunity to understand how social media-based visuals 
are used during times of conflict. Previous research on the role of visuals in propaganda and 
persuasion has demonstrated the importance of analyzing thematic elements and framing devices 
in examining the topic (e.g., Aday et al., 2005; Coleman, 2010; Goldstein, 2009; Green, 2014; 
Greenwood and Jenkins, 2015; Schwalbe et al., 2008; Schwalbe and Dougherty, 2015). Based on 
our review of previous studies and preliminary research on this topic, we pose the following 
research questions.  
 RQ1: How do images posted to the Syrian President’s Facebook page differ from those 
posted to the Syrian Coalition’s Facebook page in terms of prominent themes? 
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 RQ2: How do images posted to the Syrian President’s Facebook page differ from those 
posted to the Syrian Coalition’s Facebook page in terms of propaganda frames? 
 RQ3: How are different types of themes and frames of Facebook images associated with 
audience reactions to those images? 
Methods 
We conducted a content analysis of images posted on Syrian President Bashar al-Assad’s 
official Facebook page and the Syrian Coalition Facebook page. An image—photo, video, or 
graphic illustration—was the unit of analysis for coding themes, frames, and structural features. 
Captions accompanying images were also taken into account in coding themes and frames of 
images. Coding categories are explained later in this section. In analyzing audience reactions to 
those images, we examined numbers of likes, shares and comments—written responses to 
images posted by the Facebook groups. 
Data. The sample for this research comprises all images posted on the Syrian President’s 
Facebook page and the Syrian Coalition Facebook page from April 1, 2013 to September 30, 
2014. During the 18-month timeframe, a total of 333 images were posted—214 images on the 
Syrian President’s Facebook page and 119 images on the Syrian Coalition Facebook page. We 
chose April 2013 as the beginning month of data collection since that is the first month when 
both Facebook pages were open and active. The Syrian Coalition Facebook page and the Syrian 
President’s Facebook page were created in November 2012 and March 2013, respectively. Since 
this study compares how both sides used visuals on Facebook to propagate their messages 
around similar events during the Syrian conflict, we began our data collection with the month 
when both sides were posting to Facebook. We collected data through September 2014 to 
capture important developments of the recent Syria conflict including the Syrian chemical 
weapons case and the Islamic State insurgence in the Middle East (BBC, 2014). Facebook 
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algorithms are constantly evolving, and based on behaviors of the user and the user’s 
connections, presentation of updates or other content is adjusted. This means that those who are 
followers the Syrian President Facebook page or the Syrian Coalition page may have been 
exposed to slightly different types of content. This was not a major concern for this study, as 
both Facebook pages were public. The visual content was archived directly from the Facebook 
pages.   
Coding scheme. Previous studies in this area as well as grounded theory approach guided 
development of categories for coding themes and frames (Brantner et al., 2011; Cull et al., 2003; 
Goldstein, 2009; Seo, 2014; Strauss and Corbin, 1998). Particularly, a constant comparative 
method was used in which the visuals were analyzed by two coders, each fluent in both Arabic 
and English and trained in content analysis, for potential adoption of categories used in previous 
studies and development of new categories. This led to the following coding categories. The 
categories for coding the most prominent theme in each image were: (i) victory, (ii) threats from 
the enemy, (iii) casualties of civilians or military personnel, (iv) destruction, (v) unity, (vi) 
humanity, and (vii) other. The victory category covered images that convey defeating of the other 
side—Syrian opposition forces or Western countries from the perspective of the Syrian President 
Facebook page, and the Syrian President Assad regime from the perspective of the Syrian 
Coalition page. For example, a Facebook image showing the Syrian government force cracking 
down on opposition forces would fall into this category. The threats from the enemy theme 
concerned military capabilities of the other side such as use of chemical weapons or missiles or 
leaders of the other side soliciting domestic or international support for military attacks. An 
example in this category would be an image of the Syrian government military force on the 
Syrian Coalition Facebook page. The causalities of civilians category was applied to images of 
death, injuries, and suffering of civilians. The destruction theme covered images of infrastructure 
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in their own territories being destroyed by attacks from the other side. The unity category 
covered images aimed at promoting solidarity with foreign allies as well as among their own 
military and political forces or civilian supporters. The humanity theme covered images 
emphasizing efforts to protect innocent civilians. In addition to the prominent theme of each 
image, whether the message was mainly aimed at domestic or international audiences was also 
coded. 
Three categories were used in analyzing types of propaganda frame featured in Facebook 
images: overt vs. covert, analytical vs. emotional, and human interest vs. non-human interest. 
Previous research on propaganda guided the establishment of these items (Cull et al., 2003; 
Goldstein, 2009). The overt frame covered images that explicitly promote their own agenda or 
blame the other side for the ongoing crisis and chaos labeling it as an “evil” or aggressor. For 
example, the Syrian opposition Facebook page posted an image linking the Assad regime with 
the self-proclaimed Islamic State would fall under this category. In comparison, the covert frame 
was for images posted by the Syrian President and the Syrian opposition that implicitly promote 
their agendas. An example of the covert frame would be an image of the Syrian President 
receiving praise from Syrian citizens or foreign leaders conveying his national or international 
support despite the growing calls from Syrian opposition forces and the international community 
to step down. The analytical frame captured images that focused on facts, statistics, or analytical 
interpretations of how their own side is protecting Syrian people, how the other side is harming 
Syria, and how their own side is prepared to defeat the other side. In comparison, the emotional 
frame covered images intended to evoke emotions such as compassion for their own side and 
animosity toward the other side. Finally, the human interest frame was used to capture images 
that highlight specific individuals who suffer from attacks from the other side and help Facebook 
users associate themselves with those individuals and their stories.  
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The structural features coded were: (i) whether the image was a still photo, video, or 
graphic illustration, (ii) whether any caption accompanying an image was in English, Arabic, or 
both English and Arabic, or other language, (iii) and whether a character appearing in the image 
was child or adult.  
In coding still photos, illustrations, and videos, we followed methods used by previous 
studies of visual content analysis (Keith et al., 2009, 2010; Rose, 2012). The coders considered 
the entire image and caption associated with it in determining the most prominent theme, main 
frame, and primary character in still photos and graphic illustrations. When a still photo or a 
graphic illustration included multiple sub-images, our coding focused on the most dominant 
image—the largest image (Keith et al., 2009). For a video, the coders watched the complete 
video and used the dominant image—the image featured longest in the video—in analyzing 
those aspects (Keith et al., 2009, 2010). The videos analyzed in this study were relatively short 
with an average length was about three minutes.  
Inter-coder reliability. For an inter-coder reliability test, two trained coders fluent with 
both English and Arabic coded the same 10% of the sample images from each Facebook page 
(Krippendorff, 2004; Riffe et al., 2005). Inter-coder reliability was determined using Scott’s pi. 
The inter-coder reliability score for theme and frame was .91 and .93, respectively. The inter-
coder reliability score for the main character was .98, image type .99, caption language .99, and 
audience reactions .99.  
Data analysis. The SPSS software package was used for data analysis. Basic descriptive 
statistics and Chi-square tests were used to examine differences between the Syrian President’s 
Facebook page and the opposition’s Facebook page in terms of prominent themes, frames, and 
structural characteristics.  
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Results 
The following results are based on our content analysis of 214 images posted to the 
Syrian President’s Facebook page and 119 images posted to the Syrian National Coalition page 
from April 1, 2013 to September 30, 2014. Of the 214 images on the Syrian President’s page, 
54.2% were still photos, 40.7% videos, and 5.1% graphic illustrations. In comparison, about 
44.5% of the 119 images on the Syrian National Coalition page were still photos, another 44.5% 
graphic illustrations, and only 10.9% videos.  
 Prominent theme (RQ1). Our first research question asked how images posted to the Syrian 
President’s Facebook page differ from those posted to the Syrian Coalition’s Facebook page in 
terms of prominent themes. According to a Chi-square test, there were statistically significant 
differences between the two Facebook pages in regards to prominent themes featured in the 
images (χ2 (1, df = 6) = 69.22, p < .001). As shown in Table 1, unity (31.8%) was the most 
prominent theme among the images posted to the Syrian President Facebook page. It was 
followed by humanity (19.2%), threats from the enemy (16.4%), and victory (15.9%). It makes 
sense that the Assad regime emphasized the theme of unity in its social media efforts, as holding 
on to power was the key concern for his regime amid increased calls for his resignation from 
Syrian opposition forces and the international community in 2013 and 2014. In addition, images 
with the unity theme on the Syrian President Facebook page received a high number of likes and 
shares perhaps as people supporting the Syrian President wanted to show support for Assad 
solidifying its power base.  
 In comparison, threats from the enemy (29.4%) and casualties of civilians or military 
personnel (25.2%) were the two most prominent themes among the images posted to the Syrian 
Coalition Facebook page, as the main opposition group emphasized military threats posed by the 
Assad regime and sufferings of opposition forces and civilians under the regime. In particular, 
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the Syrian Coalition Facebook page posted in 2013 quite a few images featuring Syrian children 
killed by alleged chemical weapons attacks by the Assad regime. Images carrying the themes of 
threats from the enemy generated high levels of audience response including shares and 
comments on the Syrian Coalition Facebook page, as those supporting the opposition group 
wanted to emphasize the deprivation and oppression under the Assad regime. Visitors to the 
Syrian Coalition Facebook page also reacted actively to images conveying the theme of 
casualties of civilians. Those images were often emotional and graphic and thus may have 
encouraged support by linking, commenting on, or sharing those images. While a majority of the 
images were aimed at revealing brutalities of the Assad regime, the Syrian Coalition also 
emphasized the importance of Syrian people and activists working together to defeat the Assad 
regime by featuring images conveying the themes of unity (13.4%) and victory (13.4%).  
Both the Syrian President Facebook page and the Syrian Coalition Facebook page 
focused mainly on domestic issues in communicating these themes. However, there was a 
significant difference between the two pages in terms of how much emphasis they put on 
domestic or international issues through the images (χ2 (1, df = 2) = 5.85, p = 0.5). About 60.3% 
of the images on the Syrian President Facebook page covered domestic aspects and 39.7% 
covered international or diplomatic facets. Of the images posted to the Syrian Coalition page, 
73.1% focused on domestic situations and 26.9% on issues involving the international 
community. One of the main reasons for the higher proportion of images covering international 
or diplomatic issues on the Syrian President Facebook page is that President Assad held a series 
of meetings with foreign leaders after his re-election in June 2014. He won a landslide victory by 
getting 88.7% of the vote during the wartime election that allegedly took place only in areas 
controlled by the Assad regime (Tawfeeq and Mullen, 2014).  
 [Table 1 About Here] 
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Propaganda frames (RQ2). Our second research question asked what types of 
propaganda frames were used in the images posted to the two Facebook pages under study. 
Three categories used in analyzing frames of the images in this study are: overt vs. covert, 
analytical vs. emotional, and human interest vs. non-human interest. As shown in Table 2, the 
Syrian Coalition page (62.2%) included a significantly higher proportion of images that exhibit 
the overt frame than the Syrian President Facebook page (36.9%). According to a Chi-square 
test, the difference was statistically significant (χ2 (1, df = 1) = 19.66, p < .001).  
There was also a statistically significant difference between the two Facebook pages in 
terms of analytical vs. emotional (χ2 (1, df = 1) = 8.89, p < .01). A slightly higher proportion of 
images posted on the Syrian Coalition page adopted the emotional frame (60.5%) than those 
posted on the Syrian President Facebook page (43.5%). The Syrian President Facebook page 
featured a higher proportion of images using the analytical frame (56.5%). This is in line with 
the finding that the Syrian Coalition page emphasized causalities of civilians in describing 
situations in Syria. Images of Syrian civilians crying in front of bodies of family or friends were 
emotionally charged and often graphic. In comparison, a significant proportion of images on the 
Syrian President page showed the president’s interviews with Syrian or foreign media where he 
presented his arguments as to why he should remain the leader of the country. 
According to a Chi-square test, there was no statistically significant difference between 
the two sides in terms of the proportion of images using the human interest frame (χ2 (1, df = 1) 
= 1.15, p > 0.5). About 43.5% of the images on the Syrian President Facebook page included the 
human interest frame as compared to 49.6% of the images on the Syrian Coalition Facebook 
page. While the two sides were similar in terms of how frequently their Facebook images used 
the human interest frame, there were interesting differences as to how the frame was used as 
discussed in the next section. Most of the human interest frame images on the Syrian President 
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Facebook page covered stories of Syrian soldiers, who got injured or killed while fighting 
against Syrian opposition forces. In comparison, the human interest frame images on the Syrian 
Coalition Facebook page were used to emphasize oppression by the Syrian regime and sufferings 
of Syrian civilians.  
Indeed, images that use emotional or human interest frames received a significantly 
higher amount of audience reactions on both the Syrian President’s Facebook page and the 
Syrian Coalition Facebook page. As discussed above, images including these frames portrayed 
personal stories of specific individuals, and these approaches have shown to be effective in 
influencing the ways people think about particular issues (Brantner et al., 2011; Fahmy et al., 
2014; Goldstein, 2009; Jowett and O’Donnell, 2015).  
[Table 2 About Here] 
 Image type and audience reactions (RQ3). Our third research question asked how different 
types of theme and frame of Facebook images analyzed were associated with audience reactions 
to those images. When it comes to images on the Syrian President Facebook page, images 
featuring the theme of casualties of civilians received most audience likes (M = 2,185.37, SD = 
2,386.51), comments (M = 140.00, SD = 130.66), and shares (M = 307.00, SD = 202.98). On 
average, images featuring the unity theme received the second highest number of likes (M = 
1,625.77, SD = 1,504.13) and comments (M = 104.70, SD = 110.31) whereas images with the 
humanity theme received the second highest number of shares (M = 170.51, SD = 134.64). As 
shown in Table 3, these differences in the levels of audience reactions to images with different 
types of theme were statistically significant based on a series of analysis of variance (ANOVA) 
tests.  
[Table 3 About Here] 
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 Images conveying the themes of causalities of civilians and threats from the enemy 
received most audience reactions on the Syrian Coalition Facebook page. Specifically, images 
featuring the theme of causalities of civilians received the most likes (M = 179.96, SD = 185.30), 
the most shares (M = 100.36, SD = 121.17), and the second most comments (M = 7.03, SD = 
8.73). In addition, images carrying the theme of threats from the enemy received most comments 
(M = 7.68, SD = 12.14) and the second most likes (M = 145.91, SD = 149.27). Images with the 
destruction theme received the second most shares (M = 78.71, SD = 120.84). 
 It makes sense that viewers of both the Syrian President Facebook page and the Syrian 
Coalition page reacted most actively to images conveying the theme of casualties of civilians. 
Those images were often emotional and graphic and thus may have encouraged support by 
linking, commenting on, or sharing those images. It also seems intuitive that images with the 
unity theme were popular among people who support the Syrian President in that the Facebook 
page is aimed mainly at solidifying its power base. Images carrying the themes of threats from 
the enemy and destruction were popular on the Syrian Coalition Facebook page, probably as 
those supporting the opposition group wanted to emphasize the deprivation and oppression under 
the Assad regime. 
 In terms of types of frame and audience reactions, images that use emotional or human 
interest frames received a significantly higher amount of audience reactions on both the Syrian 
President’s Facebook page and the Syrian Coalition Facebook page (Table 4). As discussed 
above, images including these frames portrayed personal stories of specific individuals, and these 
approaches have shown to be effective in influencing the ways people think about particular 
issues (Brantner et al., 2011; Fahmy et al., 2014; Goldstein, 2009; Jowett and O’Donnell, 2014). 
The two Facebook pages differed in terms of audience reactions to overt vs. covert frames. On 
the Syrian President’s Facebook page, covert frame images generated a greater level of reactions 
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than overt frame images. In contrast, overt frame images were more popular than covert frame 
images on the Syrian Coalition Facebook page.  
[Table 4 About Here] 
Discussion and Conclusion 
Communication networks provide affordances necessary for the flow of messages among 
communicators (Benkler, 2006; Monge and Contractor, 2003). The development of the Internet 
as a medium for high-speed communication networks has had significant consequences for 
aspects of society including collaborations within and across borders, political movements, social 
change, and trade (Benkler, 2006; Castells, 2010). For example, social collaborative networks, 
facilitated by popular social media sites such as Facebook and Twitter, helped activists mobilize 
citizens, organize protests, and network with activists in neighboring countries during the so-
called Arab Spring (Kirkpatrick and Sanger, 2011; Seo and Thorson, 2012).  
These networked spaces facilitate dynamic creation, sharing, and deletion of various 
modes of communication content—text, still image, video, and audio—in one-to-one or one-to-
many communication conditions. Stories of political movements in the Middle East and North 
Africa since 2010 and subsequent conflicts in the regions were often shared via popular social 
media sites like Facebook and Twitter with significantly increased Internet penetration rates in 
the regions and around the world in recent years (Internet World Stats, 2015). This meant that 
main parties in conflicts utilized social media for their propaganda purposes while sharing 
attention-grabbing images.  
Our study analyzed visual propaganda in the social media age by examining one of the 
most significant recent examples—conflicts between the Syrian President Bashar al-Assad 
regime and Syrian opposition forces following the popular uprisings in Syria in 2011. Social 
media played a significant role in the ongoing conflict in Syria, dubbed as “the most socially 
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mediated” conflict in history (Callaghan et al., 2014: 1). Moreover, images were particularly 
salient in these conflict situations, as people preferred content that is easy to understand and 
share.   
Our results suggest that analysis of theme is an important component of visual political 
communication research involving social media sites. We found that there were statistically 
significant differences between the Syrian President’s Facebook page and the Syrian Coalition 
Facebook page in terms of prominent themes featured on the images posted to each Facebook 
page. A significant number of images on the Syrian President’s Facebook page focused on 
President Bashar al-Assad and suggested that he is a strong, fearless, and extremely forceful 
leader who acts in the best interest of the Syrian people. The most frequent theme in the images 
on the Facebook page was unity within Syria and with foreign allies. Many photos under this 
study showed his diplomatic activities with foreign allies, such as Assad receiving an award by 
Russian officials for “defending his people.” Quite a few images also featured Syrian First Lady 
Asma al-Assad depicting her as “a caring mother” for the country. She was shown consoling 
civilians and children affected by the violence. These photos instantiated the theme of humanity. 
The Syrian President’s Facebook page generally shied away from war imagery and 
acknowledging the actions or political efforts of the “enemy,” or opposition forces. Anytime 
opposition forces were mentioned, Assad characterized them as terrorists and emphasized his 
role in protecting his country. These images served to solidify the Syrian government’s 
narratives that (i) President Assad fearlessly protects its people; (ii) life has continued normally 
throughout Syria; and (iii) Assad and his wife live in a time of relative stability in the country.  
In comparison, images on the Syrian Coalition emphasized the themes of threats from the 
enemy, casualties of civilians, unity, and victory. Those images, often in the form of still photo or 
graphic illustration, explicitly expressed their messages of reviving revolution in Syria. 
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Multimedia content depicted the suffering of children, women, and the elderly. At the same time, 
it showed these individuals engaged in acts of defiance towards the regime, such as holding signs 
or participating in protests. Some images also employed the religious rhetoric of “martyrdom,” 
which appeals to its overwhelmingly religious audience (Halverson et al., 2013). Many images 
were designed to expose government violence and torture, while inspiring solidarity and action 
among ordinary Syrians. Images posted to the Syrian Coalition page also attempted to connect 
struggles of resistance in Syria to broader social issues, including class struggles and economic 
problems such as homelessness and hunger. Often times, the images made an appeal to all 
corners of Syrian society to unite and revive the demands for democratic change, political rights, 
and economic improvement many protestors made during the 2011 Syrian revolution. 
Images carrying the theme of causalities of civilians or military personnel generated were 
frequently featured on both the Syrian President’s Facebook page and the Syrian Coalition 
Facebook page. However, it was interesting to see how the same theme was conveyed by each 
side, and how those images were used to support each party’s narrative. On the Syrian Coalition 
Facebook page, the casualties of civilians theme was visualized often with graphic images of 
children or adults killed by the Assad regime. This aspect was particularly salient during the 
alleged chemical weapons attacks on civilians by the Assad regime in 2013. In comparison, the 
Syrian President Facebook page emphasized the theme with images of grieving families and 
friends of military personnel who were killed during fights against Syrian opposition forces.  
This research helps us understand mechanisms and outcomes of dynamic social 
collaborative networks activated during conflict situations. The emergence of digital media-
facilitated social collaborative networks has brought a shift from “the mass-mediated social 
spaces” to “a networked public sphere” (Benkler, 2006). Information is generated and exchanged 
without necessarily going through traditional intermediaries. The result is the rapid emergence 
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and extinction of networked spaces. A consequence is that the distribution of information often 
becomes more decentralized, even as many of the underlying and enabling communication 
protocols remain largely under the centralized control of governments and large-scale service 
providers (themselves subject to government regulation and control). This study helps us 
understand characteristics of images posted on social media sites during conflicts—images that 
are not mediated by mass media. Most of studies in visual framing of conflict situations have 
focused on images featured on mainstream media (e.g., Aday et al., 2005; Greenwood and 
Jenkins, 2015; Schwalb et al., 2008).  
Our research shows framing is an important component of visual political communication 
research involving social media sites. The Syrian government used visual frames to support its 
narrative that President Assad is a fearless leader protecting its people and that life has continued 
normally throughout Syria. The Syrian opposition used various images to solidify its narrative of 
the Assad regime’s brutality and sufferings of Syrian civilians. Moreover, this study shows that 
traditional frame categories remain to be relevant in analyzing social media-based propaganda 
images. As discussed in the Methods section, we used three propaganda frame categories—overt 
vs. covert, analytical vs. emotional, and human interest vs. non-human interest—guided by 
previous research (Cull et al., 2003; Goldstein, 2009; Jowett and O’Donnell, 2015). These 
categories were pertinent in analyzing images posted to the two Facebook pages under this study. 
The covert frame was prominent in images on the Syrian President Facebook page, as the Syrian 
government used subtle imagery in stressing that things are orderly in Syria and most people are 
doing well under the Assad regime. For example, the Syrian President’s Facebook page posted 
images of the President and the First Lady attending cultural events or events for children. These 
images implicitly indicate that things are normal in Syria despite tension within the country and 
with other countries. In contrast, the overt frame was frequently used in images on the Syrian 
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Coalition Facebook page, as the opposition group focused on more explicit messaging of calling 
the Syrian President “evil” and urging Syrian people and the international community to join 
their fight against the Assad regime. For example, with the ISIS making international headlines, 
the Syrian Coalition changed its cover image to a graphic illustration featuring the portrait of 
Assad being crossed, which was accompanied by a caption reading, “Assad Regime is the root 
cause of ISIS. It must be defeated alongside ISIS” (Figure 1). 
[Figure 1 About Here] 
The human interest frame was also significant. This finding is in line with previous 
research showing human interest frame is widely used in media coverage of international 
conflicts (Schwalbe et al., 2008; Schwalbe and Dougherty, 2015). For example, in covering the 
U.S.-led war in Iraq, media reports showed troops, Iraqi civilians, or journalists bringing a 
human element in presenting an event or issue (de Vreese and Semetko, 2000; Schwalbe et al., 
2008). In this study, most of the human interest frame images on the Syrian President Facebook 
page covered stories of Syrian soldiers, who got injured or killed while fighting against Syrian 
opposition forces, and how their family and friends are taking care of them or coping with the 
death of their loved ones. Often times, Syrian First Lady Asma al-Assad appeared in those 
images shown as comforting soldiers or families (Figure 2). In comparison, the human interest 
frame images on the Syrian Coalition Facebook page were used to emphasize oppression by the 
Syrian regime and sufferings of Syrian civilians (Figure 3). In doing so, they highlighted specific 
individuals to convey their message and encourage viewers to feel personally connected to those 
individuals.  
Moreover, this study showed that images using the emotional or human interest frame 
were more effective in generating audience reactions. It should be noted, however, that images 
with the human interest frame on the Syrian Coalition Facebook page received a higher number 
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of comments and shares but a significantly lower number of likes, compared with images 
without the human interest frame. This makes sense in that images with the human interest frame 
on the Syrian Coalition Facebook page often described civilian sufferings. Therefore, Facebook 
users may not have wanted to “like” the images since the act of “liking” on Facebook is often 
considered endorsing what is shown in the image. Instead, they may have chosen to share or 
comment on the stories. This suggests that looking at specific types of audience reactions on 
social media sites is important for a nuanced understanding of the interplay between content type 
and audience responses to the content.  
[Figures 2 and 3 About Here] 
The current study updates literature on framing (e.g., Entman, 1993; Melki, 2014; Reese, 
2007; Scheufele and Tewksbury, 2007), in particular visual framing (e.g., Borah, 2009; Brantner 
et al., 2011; Domke et al., 2002; Green, 2014; Greenwood and Jenkins, 2015; Schwalbe and 
Dougherty, 2015). Previous studies on framing focused mostly on how mass media used framing 
devices—for example, conflict, peace, or human interest frames—in covering major events. By 
analyzing how visual frames are used in social media sites during an international conflict, this 
study helps us better understand how framing is adopted in a networked public space (Benkler, 
2016) as opposed to mass media-mediated contexts. As discussed above, this study finds that 
framing categories used in previous studies were relevant, but a more diverse approach to 
framing is found in the networked space. Frame categories developed as part of this study should 
be useful for future studies in this area.  
This study also contributes to enhancing our understanding of propaganda in the 
networked information age. While previous models of propaganda emphasized heavily on the 
role of mass media and one-way communication types (Cull and Welch, 2003; Herman and 
Chomsky, 1988), our research shows that active two-way communication between the 
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propagandist and the public has become more common, as social media has emerged as an 
important channel for messaging. Signs of increased interactivity between political actors and the 
mass public and their potential influence on strengthening or weakening of messages were 
particularly salient in the case of the Syrian Coalition Facebook page. New information or 
arguments were often introduced as a consequence of exchanges between the Facebook page 
management team and visitors of the Facebook pages or exchanges between Facebook page 
visitors. In addition, English and Arabic comments on the site by the public often invited 
additional comments on the content posted by the Syrian Coalition. One can argue that 
exchanges between the Facebook page manager and the public on the Syrian President’s 
Facebook page is largely manufactured by the Office of the Syrian Presidency. Indeed, the 
absolute majority of the comments on the site were supportive of the president. We should not 
ignore, however, the fact that these exchanges still influence how messages are perceived and 
shared by people who visit the Facebook page. Therefore, it is important to take into account 
different types of interactions between the political actors and the public on social media sites 
and outcomes of these interactions.  
Most of all, this research highlights the importance of incorporating two-way 
communication between the propagandist and the public in developing a new propaganda model 
reflecting the changing media environment. Jowett and O’Donnell (2015) introduced one of the 
latest models of the process of propaganda in their updated book, Propaganda and Persuasion. 
While the model rightly captures social-historical context and influence of mass media and the 
public on propaganda messages, it doesn’t sufficiently consider interactions taking place at 
digital media-based networked spaces. As shown in the current research, social collaborative 
networks enabled by digital media technologies have emerged as important forces for creating 
and diffusing propaganda messages. An updated model of propaganda should pay more attention 
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to this aspect. In addition, social interactions via social media could be better understood by 
integrating information from several distinct layers—communication network system, networked 
space, and socio-political layers. For example, changes in the communication system layer (e.g., 
disruption of Internet connectivity) influence types of communication tools used, how groups 
interact, and modes of shared content. Modeling interactions between layers enables a more 
robust picture of social interactions and supports high-level situational awareness in rapidly 
changing, often highly non-linear, communication environments.  
 Limitations and future research. As with any empirical research, our study is not without 
limitations. We analyzed one Facebook page each from the Syrian government side and the 
opposition side. While each page was the most representative of each side—for example, the 
National Coalition of Syrian Revolution and Opposition Forces (Syrian Coalition) has 
represented Syrian opposition groups in international meetings (Bouchard, 2014)—an analysis of 
multiple Facebook pages from each side would draw a more complete picture. Similarly, it 
would be helpful to compare images featured on the Syrian Coalition Facebook page with those 
on other Syrian opposition groups’ Facebook pages.  
 Future research may compare themes and frames of images on the Syrian President 
Facebook page and the Syrian Coalition Facebook page with images used by mass media outlets 
that the two sides were relying on to promote their agenda. A follow-up study may also examine 
the role of social influencers in social media-based visual propaganda. In networked spheres 
characterized by increased disintermediation and decentralization, information propagation and 
diffusion is increasingly influenced by those with significant clout in the digital sphere. Thus 
identifying social influencers and understanding their roles in the process of information 
propagation is essential.   
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Figure 1. October 2014 cover photo of the Syrian National Coalition Facebook Page  
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Figure 2. An image conveying the human interest frame that was posted to the Syrian President’s 
Facebook page  
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Figure 3. An image conveying the human interest frame that was posted to the Syrian National 
Coalition Facebook page 
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Table 1. Prominent Themes 
 Syrian President 
Facebook Page 
Syrian National 
Coalition Facebook page 
Theme Count Percent(%) Count Percent(%) 
Victory 34 15.9 16 13.4 
Threats from the enemy 35 16.4 35 29.4 
Casualties of civilians or 
military personnel 
8 3.7 30 25.2 
Destruction 2 0.9 7 5.9 
Unity  68 31.8 16 13.4 
Humanity 41 19.2 4 3.4 
Other 26 12.1 11 9.2 
Total 214 100 119 100 
Note. According to a Chi-square test, there were statistically significant differences between the 
two sides in terms of prominent themes portrayed in their Facebook images (χ2 (1, df = 6) = 
69.22, p < .001).  
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Table 2. Propaganda Frames 
Frame Syrian President 
Facebook Page 
Syrian National Coalition 
Facebook page 
 Count Percent(%) Count Percent(%) 
Overt vs. covert     
Overt 79 36.9 74 62.2 
Covert 135 63.1 45 37.8 
Total  214 100 119 100 
Chi-square analysis result: χ2 (1, df = 1) = 19.66, p < .001) 
 
Analytical vs. emotional     
Analytical  121 56.5 47 39.5 
Emotional 93 43.5 72 60.5 
Total  214 100 119 100 
Chi-square analysis results: χ2 (1, df = 1) = 8.89, p < .01) 
 
Human interest vs. non-human interest 
Human interest  93 43.5 59 49.6 
Non-human interest 121 56.5 60 50.4 
Total 214 100 119 100 
Chi-square analysis results: χ2 (1, df = 1) = 1.15, p > 0.5) 
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Table 3. ANOVA Results for Theme Type and Audience Reactions 
 Syrian President   National Coalition  





































































































Note. This table shows means and standard deviations (in parentheses). a and b indicate 
statistically significant mean differences according to Scheffe post hoc tests, 1(F = 4.75, p 
<.001); 2(F = 3.12, p <.01); 3(F = 2.83, p <.05); 4(F = 3.02, p <.01); 5(F = 1.36, p = n.s.); 6(F = 
3.11, p <.01). 
Table 4. ANOVA Results for Frame Type and Audience Reactions 
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 Syrian President   National Coalition  
Frame         Likes Comment Shares  Likes Comment Shares 
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Note. This table shows means and standard deviations (in parentheses). Mean difference test 
results (F, p-value) are based on ANOVA analysis.  
 
